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ABSTRACT—In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that criminal 
defense attorneys must warn their noncitizen clients of the adverse 
immigration consequences that may result from a guilty plea. Lower federal 
courts will inevitably expand the rule from Padilla to apply to other so-
called “collateral consequences” of guilty pleas. Although the extension of 
Padilla to more (or all) collateral consequences of guilty pleas might 
theoretically raise the standard of defense attorney effectiveness and thus 
benefit criminal defendants, the reality is that the cost of extension will 
outweigh the benefits, because the provision of effective assistance will 
become prohibitively costly. If “Padilla warnings” are ultimately required 
for all collateral consequences of a guilty plea, criminal lawyers will have a 
difficult time effectively assisting their clients. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jose Padilla, a Honduran national but a forty-year permanent resident 
of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana in the state 
of Kentucky.1 Under United States law, almost all drug-related offenses, 
including marijuana possession, render non-United States citizens who 
commit them “deportable.”2 However, Padilla’s attorney, who advised him 
to plead guilty, did not inform him of the risk of deportation.3 Instead, he 
incorrectly advised Padilla that he “did not have to worry about 
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”4 
Six days after entry of judgment, Padilla’s correctional facility notified 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that it had lodged a 
detainer against Padilla as a precursor to deportation.5 He then filed a 
motion for postconviction relief in which he alleged that his attorney 
 
1
  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010). 
2
  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (rendering “deportable” any alien who is convicted of a 
violation of any law or regulation—state, federal, or foreign—relating to a controlled substance, with the 
exception of “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana”). 
3
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
4
  Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
5
  Brief for Petitioner at 10 n.3, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1497552, at *10 
n.3. 
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provided ineffective assistance of counsel.6 Following conflicting decisions 
at the trial and appellate levels—the trial court denying postconviction relief 
and the appellate court granting it—the Kentucky Supreme Court denied 
Padilla’s motion.7 The court found that the possibility of deportation was a 
collateral consequence8 of a guilty plea and held that neither affirmative 
misadvice about nor failure to advise of a collateral consequence constituted 
a violation of a person’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.9 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.10 The 
Court held that “constitutionally competent counsel would have advised 
[Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation.”11 Since Padilla’s counsel failed to so advise him, 
Padilla would, on remand, be able to argue that his attorney had been 
ineffective.12 
Some commentators have called the Padilla decision a boon for both 
criminal defendants and the criminal defense bar.13 To some extent, it was: 
the decision was certainly favorable to Jose Padilla himself, and the 
requirement that criminal defense lawyers learn the basics of immigration 
law in order to provide “Padilla warnings”14 to their clients might similarly 
assist other noncitizen criminal defendants. As a result of the decision, 
those defendants—if they did not receive Padilla warnings—may be able to 
obtain postconviction relief in the form of withdrawn guilty pleas, new 
trials, or both. 
 
6
  Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
7
  Id. at 485. 
8
  A collateral consequence is one that is not a “definite, immediate, and largely automatic” result of 
a criminal conviction. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008). 
9
  Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485 (“As collateral consequences are outside the scope 
of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to advise 
Appellee of such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides no basis for 
relief.”). 
10
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
11
  Id. 
12
  Id. Padilla would still have to show that he was prejudiced by this ineffective assistance, an issue 
the Supreme Court declined to reach. Note also that Padilla’s attorney affirmatively provided him with 
inaccurate advice rather than merely failing to adequately advise him. The Court dismissed this 
distinction. Id. at 1484 (“A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite . . . absurd results.”). 
However, the Court’s failure to distinguish between affirmative misadvice and failure to advise arguably 
renders the holding unnecessarily broad insofar as it applies to failure-to-advise situations, which will be 
discussed later in this Note. See infra Part II.A. 
13
  See, e.g., Eric T. Berkman, Case on Collateral Attacks Could Empower Defense Bar, MASS. 
LAW. WKLY., Oct. 26, 2009, at 1. 
14
  This phrase was coined by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Padilla. See Padilla, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although it does not seem to have been adopted yet by federal courts 
applying Padilla, it is used in this Note to refer to the warnings of potential immigration consequences 
(or other collateral consequences) that attorneys are required to give their clients after Padilla. 
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This Note argues that while the decision in Padilla was a win for Jose 
Padilla and similarly situated noncitizen criminal defendants, it poses 
significant problems for criminal defendants, their lawyers, and the entire 
criminal justice system. The majority’s opinion purported to limit itself to 
immigration consequences15 and it justified that limitation by pointing to the 
“severity” of deportation.16 However, guilty pleas can have innumerable 
collateral consequences other than deportation, and their relative severities 
are in the eye of the beholder.17 For this reason, Justice Scalia, in dissent, 
expressed an ominous concern that there was “no logical stopping-point” 
between requiring Padilla warnings for immigration and requiring such 
warnings for other—or even all—collateral consequences.18 
Mere months after the Padilla decision was handed down, Justice 
Scalia’s fear was shown prescient as federal courts began to expand Padilla 
to apply to nondeportation collateral consequences. In September 2010, in 
Bauder v. Department of Corrections,19 the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld an ineffectiveness claim in a case in which an attorney 
provided inaccurate advice about the possibility of civil confinement.20 This 
decision could be an anomaly, but it could just as easily be the first in a 
series of decisions extending Padilla. Some legal scholars argued, even 
before Padilla was decided, that attorneys should have to warn their clients 
of the collateral consequences of guilty pleas.21 While Padilla and Bauder 
may be the first steps in granting that wish, requiring warnings for all 
collateral consequences of guilty pleas will give rise to unintended and 
undesirable consequences. 
Although the extension of Padilla to more (or all) collateral 
consequences of guilty pleas would theoretically raise the standard of 
attorney effectiveness and thus benefit criminal defendants, the reality is 
that the costs of extension will likely outweigh the benefits. Requiring 
Padilla warnings for every collateral consequence will, in fact, have the 
exact opposite effect from the one that is intended: it will make the 
provision of effective assistance prohibitively costly. If Padilla warnings 
 
15
  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (“[W]e now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his 
plea carries a risk of deportation.”). 
16
  Id. (“The severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of banishment or exile[]’—only underscores 
how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.” (quoting 
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)) (citation omitted)). 
17
  For instance, reasonable people could differ as to whether being forced to return to one’s country 
of citizenship is more severe than being subjected to indefinite civil confinement. 
18
  Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19
  619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
20
  Id. at 1273, 1275. 
21
  See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697 (2002); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively 
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 119 (2009). 
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are ultimately required for all collateral consequences of a guilty plea, 
criminal lawyers will have a difficult time effectively assisting any of their 
clients. 
The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part I briefly provides 
a general background on ineffective assistance of counsel and describes the 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel that prevailed prior to Padilla. 
Part II describes the effect of the Padilla decision on ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. More specifically, Part II examines the narrow effect that 
the majority expected the case to have. Part III discusses the concern voiced 
by Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Padilla and discusses the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Bauder, which may very well be the first in a series of 
circuit court decisions that bear out Justice Scalia’s fears. Part IV discusses 
the practical problems that will attend the expansion of Padilla to collateral 
consequences other than deportation. Part V recommends that courts 
interpret Padilla narrowly to prevent its expansion. 
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GENERALLY 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for 
his defense.”22 This guarantee does more than merely protect a criminal 
defendant’s right to hire counsel.23 In 1938, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the Sixth Amendment to require that a criminal defendant could not be 
convicted unless he was represented by counsel or waived his right to 
representation, effectively guaranteeing that federal criminal defendants 
who could not afford a lawyer would be provided one.24 In 1963, the Court 
expanded the guarantee of counsel at government expense to indigent 
criminal defendants in state courts.25 
The Supreme Court further expanded its reading of the Sixth 
Amendment’s assistance of counsel guarantee in McMann v. Richardson,26 
holding that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.”27 Thus, the Court wrote in the landmark case Strickland v. 
Washington28 that it is not sufficient “[t]hat a person who happens to be a 
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused.”29 Rather, “[a]n accused is 
 
22
  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
23
  This was not always the case. Courts formerly interpreted the Sixth Amendment to guarantee 
merely the right to procure counsel if a defendant chose and could afford to do so. See United States v. 
Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (“There is . . . no general obligation on the part of the 
government . . . [to] retain counsel for defendants or prisoners.”). 
24
  See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938). 
25
  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
26
  397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
27
  Id. at 771 n.14 (emphasis added) (citing cases). 
28
  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
29
  Id. at 685. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 356 
entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who 
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.”30 To determine 
whether an attorney has been effective, federal courts use the two-pronged 
test that the Supreme Court established in Strickland. The first question is 
whether a criminal defendant’s attorney rendered counsel that was 
“deficient.”31 If a defendant received constitutionally deficient counsel, 
courts move on to the second prong and consider whether the defendant 
was “prejudiced” by the deficient performance.32 The two parts of the 
Strickland test are discussed in turn. 
In order to satisfy the first prong and show that an attorney provided 
constitutionally deficient assistance, a criminal defendant must demonstrate 
that his attorney’s performance fell below an “objective standard of 
reasonableness.”33 The Strickland Court, declining to define the standard by 
reference to particular conduct, wrote that “[t]he proper measure of attorney 
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.”34 As benchmarks of reasonableness, the Court suggested 
“[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like.”35 
If a criminal defendant’s attorney fails to render performance 
consistent with prevailing professional norms and thus does not meet the 
objective standard of reasonableness, courts move on to the second inquiry: 
whether the ineffective assistance prejudiced the defense.36 In order to show 
prejudice, a defendant must show that his attorney’s deficient performance 
had an “adverse effect” on his defense.37 More specifically, a defendant 
asserting an ineffective assistance claim “must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”38 
The defendant in Strickland claimed that he had received ineffective 
assistance in a capital sentencing proceeding, but the Court declined to 
 
30
  Id. 
31
  Id. at 687 (“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”). 
32
  Id. (“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”). 
33
  Id. at 687–88. Courts presume that counsel acted reasonably, so the onus is on the defendant to 
satisfy the first prong. Id. at 690 (“[T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to 
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment.”). 
34
  Id. at 688 (“More specific guidelines are not appropriate.”). 
35
  Id. Note that the court did not go so far as to say that reasonableness and compliance with 
professional norms are the same thing—such norms are “only guides.” Id. 
36
  Id. at 693. 
37
  Id. 
38
  Id. at 694. The Court went on to define “reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 
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distinguish between such a proceeding and a typical trial.39 And in Hill v. 
Lockhart,40 the Court further expanded Strickland by applying it to the plea 
process.41 In that case, the Court explained that in applying the Strickland 
test to the plea process, courts should leave the first prong unchanged but 
interpret the second prong to require a criminal defendant contesting a plea 
to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”42 
The decision in Hill expanded Strickland’s reach considerably. 
Roughly 95% of all criminal convictions result from guilty pleas rather than 
trials.43 Thus, at its advent, the Strickland test was the standard for 
ineffective assistance claims asserted by perhaps 5% of all convicts. After 
Hill, the other 95% of convicted criminal defendants would also have to 
meet the Strickland standard in order to show ineffective assistance.44 
II. THE EFFECT OF PADILLA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
The Padilla Court held that in order to meet the Strickland test’s 
“objective standard of reasonableness,” an attorney must apprise his 
noncitizen criminal defendant client of the possibility of deportation as a 
collateral consequence of a guilty plea.45 The Court remanded to the 
Kentucky Supreme Court for consideration of the prejudice question in 
light of this new rule.46 
In the most straightforward sense, Padilla may not mark a particularly 
significant departure from the Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence. Justice Stevens’s opinion for the majority makes clear that 
the Court was simply applying the Strickland test to a guilty plea as Hill 
requires.47 Thus, in the narrowest terms, the Court was merely following 
Strickland and finding that in the particular circumstances before it, 




  Id. at 686–87. 
40
  474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
41
  See id. at 58 (“We hold . . . that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges 
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
42
  Id. at 59. 
43
  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 n.13 (2010) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17, 450 
tbl.5.46 (2005) [hereinafter DOJ SOURCEBOOK]). 
44
  Note that these numbers are potentially inaccurate (but are nevertheless illustrative) because the 
95% figure cited in Padilla was based on statistics from 2000 and 2001, and the decision in Hill was 
handed down fifteen years earlier. See DOJ SOURCEBOOK, supra note 43. 
45
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
46
  Id. at 1487. 
47
  Id. at 1485 n.12 (“Whether Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from Hill . . . .”). 
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But Padilla did more than this. The Court may have been applying the 
Strickland test to the facts before it, but it was also creating a rule for courts 
to follow in the future. The Padilla opinion and the rule it established suffer 
from three shortcomings that are further discussed in this Part: (1) the rule 
is broader than the facts of Padilla demanded, creating ambiguity about 
how to apply Padilla in future cases, (2) the opinion established a bright-
line rule (which is unusual in this area of law), and (3) lower federal courts 
will disagree as to whether and how to apply the Padilla rule retroactively. 
A. Padilla’s Two Possible Rules 
The reach of the rule the Court announced in Padilla will depend on 
whether courts opt to follow the holding as set forth by the majority or 
interpret the case more narrowly. The majority’s stated rule could be read as 
dictum because Padilla’s attorney did not simply fail to inform him that he 
would be deported as a result of his plea deal. Rather, the attorney 
affirmatively told Padilla that he would not be deported.48 Thus, any portion 
of the opinion that would require defense attorneys to affirmatively provide 
warnings about deportation, instead of simply requiring them not to 
misinform their clients about deportation risks, was unnecessarily broad. 
As a result of the opinion’s broad language, there are two different 
ways in which future courts might apply Padilla. The narrower possible 
rule is that if a criminal defendant’s attorney incorrectly advises him that 
his guilty plea will not cause him to be deported, that misadvice constitutes 
deficient performance. The broader possible rule, the one that the Court 
said it was imposing,49 is that attorneys must warn their noncitizen criminal 
defendant clients of the immigration consequences that may attend a guilty 
plea. 
B. Padilla as a Bright-Line Rule50 
The Padilla decision creates a bright-line rule by establishing an entire 
category of cases that, regardless of the specific circumstances of each 
individual case, constitute per se deficient performance of counsel. The 
creation of such a rule is an anomaly among the cases following Strickland. 
The Court in Strickland explicitly refused to set out specific guidelines to 
define reasonableness.51 In later cases applying Strickland, the Court has 
continuously rejected per se rules that obviated the need to examine the 
 
48
  Id. at 1478. 
49
  Id. at 1486. 
50
  The Court sets out its holding in Padilla as if it is a bright-line rule: “[W]e now hold that counsel 
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” Id. Accordingly, this Note assumes 
that the Court did, in fact, mean to establish such a rule. 
51
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (instructing courts to consider the specific 
facts of each case and decide “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the 
circumstances”). 
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specific facts of a case to consider whether counsel acted reasonably.52 In 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Court reversed, as inconsistent with Strickland, a 
number of decisions that had created a per se rule requiring counsel to file a 
notice of appeal unless specifically instructed by their clients not to.53 The 
Court reasoned that Strickland required a “circumstance-specific 
reasonableness inquiry” and that, therefore, the affirmative obligation that 
the lower courts had imposed could not hold up.54 But the Padilla Court has 
now established the very type of bright-line rule—one imposing an 
affirmative obligation on counsel—that it previously struck down in Flores-
Ortega. 
C. Retroactivity 
There is not yet a general consensus as to whether Padilla applies 
retroactively.55 Some courts have applied Padilla retroactively,56 while 
others have declined to do so.57 
The landmark Supreme Court retroactivity case, and the starting point 
for questions of retroactivity, is Teague v. Lane.58 In that case, the Court 
held that as a general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure do 
not apply retroactively to cases that are already final.59 Under Teague, the 
question is whether Padilla created a “new constitutional rule of criminal 
procedure.”60 A California court considering the retroactivity of Padilla 
(and finding it retroactive) explained: “When the Supreme Court applies a 
well-established rule of law in a new way based on the specific facts of a 
particular case, it does not generally establish a new rule.”61 There is no 
question that the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel standard is a 
 
52
  See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000) (“We reject this per se rule as inconsistent 
with Strickland’s holding . . . . The Court of Appeals failed to engage in the circumstance-specific 
reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland, and that alone mandates vacatur and remand.”). 
53
  Id. 
54
  Id. 
55
  In other words, it is not clear whether Padilla would be applicable to cases in which direct review 
(trial and noncollateral-review appeals) had already concluded at the time it was handed down. 
56
  See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640–41 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that Padilla did 
not announce a new rule, but rather that it applied the rule from Strickland to new facts, such that it was 
retroactively applicable). 
57
  See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that Padilla 
announced a new rule and was not subject to either of the exceptions from Teague that would render it 
retroactively applicable). 
58
  489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
59
  Id. at 310 (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules 
are announced.”). “Final,” in this context, means that direct appeals have been exhausted. 
60
  Id. at 316. 
61
  United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) 
(citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1992); Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 885 (4th Cir. 
1994)).  
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“well-established rule of law,” so the turning point for courts deciding 
Padilla’s retroactivity is the question whether the Padilla Court was merely 
applying Strickland or was creating a new and separate rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure. This question could go either way—as 
evidenced by conflicting federal district court rulings on the subject—but 
the majority opinion in Padilla does explicitly state that it is applying 
Strickland rather than ignoring Strickland and creating a separate rule.62 
While it is unlikely that all of the federal circuits (to say nothing of the 
district courts) will agree on the issue of retroactivity, some states and 
federal districts will presumably apply Padilla retroactively. 
III. EXTENDING PADILLA 
There are two primary ways of looking at deportation as a collateral 
consequence, and courts’ selection among these two views will determine 
the breadth of the Padilla rule in the coming years. These two views can be 
seen in the majority and dissent in Padilla. The majority assumes that 
immigration consequences are unique,63 while the dissent argues that 
deportation is merely one of many similar collateral consequences.64 
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens took the position that 
deportation is fundamentally different from other collateral consequences. 
Over fifty years ago, the Court described deportation as “the equivalent of 
banishment or exile.”65 The Padilla majority echoed this, noting the 
“seriousness of deportation” and its “concomitant impact . . . on families 
living lawfully in this country.”66 In fact, the Padilla Court wrote that “as a 
matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the 
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”67 By describing 
deportation as “integral” to the sentencing process, the Court attempted to 
differentiate deportation from other consequences that are collateral to the 
plea itself. If, as the majority suggests, deportation is unique, and uniquely 
serious, as a collateral consequence, the logic in Padilla ought not extend to 
other consequences. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Padilla took the opposite view. He warned 
that there was “no logical stopping-point” that would limit the majority’s 
holding to deportation.68 Justice Scalia argued that there is no logical 
difference between immigration consequences of a guilty plea and other 
 
62
  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”). 
63
  Id. at 1486. 
64
  Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
65
  Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947). 
66
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
67
  Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). 
68
  Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
106:351  (2012) “o Logical Stopping-Point” 
 361
collateral consequences. If deportation cannot be distinguished from other 
collateral consequences on the basis of its relative seriousness or severity,69 
or its relatedness to the penalties imposed by a criminal sentence, it will be 
difficult for courts to limit Padilla to the context in which it was decided. 
Extension of Padilla is no longer speculative—it has already occurred. 
The following subparts first discuss some collateral consequences that may 
tempt courts to extend Padilla and then analyze the first federal appellate 
case to extend the requirement of Padilla warnings to a non-immigration 
collateral consequence. 
A. Other Collateral Consequences70 
Relatively few of the possible detrimental effects of a guilty plea are 
actually considered “direct” consequences.71 Direct consequences are those 
that have a “definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range 
of punishment.”72 Collateral consequences, on the other hand, are those that 
are not direct consequences—they are not definite, immediate, and 
automatic.73 Consequences are collateral, rather than direct, when they have 
“no effect whatsoever upon the length or nature” of the actual criminal 
sentence.74 If a judge can impose a penalty for a guilty plea but doing so is 
discretionary, the penalty is collateral.75 Similarly, a consequence is 
generally collateral if its imposition is contingent upon action by a 
governmental agency or another actor outside the control of the sentencing 
judge.76 These are only some of the definitions or categories of collateral 
 
69
  As both the concurrence and the dissent point out, guilty pleas can come with a variety of 
consequences that are collateral rather than direct, and many such consequences would be as severe as 
deportation. See id. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70
  The categorization of the consequences of guilty pleas as direct or collateral is relevant to two 
different inquiries: (1) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause issues presented by the 
question whether a criminal defendant pleaded guilty “voluntarily” and (2) Sixth Amendment issues like 
those presented in Padilla relating to effective assistance of counsel. Because the definitions of “direct” 
and “collateral” consequences are consistent across these two areas, due process cases dealing with 
collateral-consequence issues are often cited in this Part. 
71
  See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 
670, 672 (2008) (explaining that only prison, fines, and other criminal punishments imposed by the 
sentencing judge are considered direct consequences). 
72
  21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008); see also United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536, 
537 (9th Cir. 1997) (giving the same definition of direct consequences); United States v. U.S. Currency 
in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 915–16 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). 
73
  For a more in-depth critique of circuit courts’ varying and arguably vague definitions of collateral 
versus direct consequences, see Roberts, supra note 71, at 689–93. 
74
  United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Ray, 828 F.2d 
399, 418 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). 
75
  See, e.g., Kikuyama, 109 F.3d at 537 (“[T]he consequence is ‘collateral’ where it lies within the 
discretion of the court to impose it.” (citing United States v. Wills, 881 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1989))). 
76
  See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008 & Supp. 2011); see also United States v. 
Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the consequence is contingent upon action taken 
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consequences, and there is, as might be expected, variance in definitions 
across circuits.77 The variance across circuits is not of tremendous 
importance here, and for the purposes of this Note it suffices to summarize 
collateral consequences as those that are unrelated to the actual penalties 
imposed at sentencing, are imposed at the discretion of the sentencing 
judge, or are outside of that judge’s control. 
Certain collateral consequences, particularly those that are of similar 
“seriousness” to the immigration consequences addressed in Padilla, bear 
specific enumeration and discussion here.78 
Perhaps the single most pernicious potential consequence of a guilty 
plea that courts consider collateral is civil confinement. Certain categories 
of crimes can subject individuals who commit them to indefinite civil 
confinement at the conclusion of a prison sentence.79 Even though civil 
confinement essentially amounts to additional prison time for a conviction 
for which a sentence was already imposed and served, courts consider civil 
confinement collateral to the plea.80 Based on the reasoning that the 
statutory procedures for imposing civil confinement involve a number of 
steps and independent actors’ determinations that do not “directly” follow 
from a guilty plea, courts have held such confinement to be collateral even 
where the criminal would be confined for life.81 
Another collateral consequence is disenfranchisement. Historically, the 
right to vote has been considered one of the most important rights possessed 
by American citizens. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right 
to vote is a “precious” and “fundamental” right82 because it is “preservative 
of all rights.”83 However, states can nevertheless prohibit their citizens from 
voting based on criminal convictions. When they do so following a guilty 
plea, the disenfranchisement is a collateral consequence of the plea.84 
 
by an individual or individuals other th[a]n the sentencing court—such as another governmental agency 
or the defendant himself—the consequence is generally ‘collateral.’” (quoting Kikuyama, 109 F.3d at 
537)). 
77
  See Roberts, supra note 71, at 689–93. 
78
  All of the circuit court decisions cited in this section were, as may be obvious, decided before 
Padilla. 
79
  For instance, a “sexually dangerous person” can be civilly committed past the end of a prison 
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006); see also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 
(2010) (sustaining such civil commitment against a constitutional challenge and noting the existence of 
similar state civil commitment laws). 
80
  See, e.g., George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110–11 (8th Cir. 1984); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 
475 F.2d 1364, 1365–66 (4th Cir. 1973). 
81
  See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2004). 
82
  Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
83
  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
84
  Waddy v. Davis, 445 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971) (referring to disenfranchisement as “an indirect or 
collateral consequence”). 
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Even the possibility of imposition of additional criminal liability for 
the same act or event is considered a collateral consequence. Where an 
individual pleads guilty in state court, for instance, the possibility that a 
federal prosecutor will subsequently press federal charges for the acts and 
events underlying the state plea is collateral.85 Thus, in United States v. 
Ayala,86 a criminal defendant was not permitted to withdraw a guilty plea 
entered in state court where he had been informed neither by the trial court 
nor by his attorney that it was possible that the federal government would 
use the plea and its underlying facts to initiate a federal criminal 
prosecution against him.87 The federal charges were considered collateral 
even though the state plea would be used as evidence against the defendant 
in the separate federal proceeding.88 
Numerous other consequences of guilty pleas are “serious,” and are 
potentially life changing, but are nevertheless considered collateral. Civil 
forfeiture, for instance, is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.89 So too 
is the loss of certain public benefits.90 Government benefits that can become 
unavailable due to a criminal conviction include welfare benefits such as 
food stamps or coverage under the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families Act, federal student loans, and even the availability of public 
housing.91 Courts have considered the loss of such federal benefits a 
collateral consequence.92 Similarly, the loss of the ability to obtain a 




  See, e.g., United States v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the use of a 
state court guilty plea in a federal court proceeding was collateral to the plea). 
86
  601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010). 
87
  Id. at 270. 
88
  Id. 
89
  See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (holding that civil forfeiture was collateral because the defendant’s “criminal conviction was 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition precedent to forfeiture of the currency” and the plea did 
not “cause” the forfeiture). 
90
  See generally Alicia Werning Truman, Note, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should 
Be Warned Others Could Lose Public Housing If They Plead Guilty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1753 (2004) 
(discussing the variety of public-benefits-related collateral consequences to guilty pleas). 
91
  Id. at 1756–58; see also 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2006) (providing for the denial of federal benefits to 
persons convicted of drug crimes). 
92
  See, e.g., United States v. Morse, 36 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994). But see United States v. 
Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the loss of federal benefits after a guilty 
plea was a direct consequence because it was an automatic result of conviction). 
93
  See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988). 
94
  See Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 380–81 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam). 
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B. The First Extension of Padilla 
The list of collateral consequences of pleading guilty to a crime is a 
long one. Many of the consequences discussed above are of comparable 
seriousness to deportation. However, the mere existence of collateral 
consequences to which Padilla could plausibly be extended will not 
automatically beget extension. If Padilla is to be extended, individual 
courts must do the legwork that the majority’s opinion did not, and must 
make the “logical” leap Justice Scalia’s dissent predicted they would,95 by 
reading Padilla’s holding broadly enough to reach past immigration. Thus 
far, only one circuit court has made this leap: the Eleventh Circuit explained 
the central holding of Padilla as if it applied to collateral consequences in 
general.96 Such a reading, if adopted in other circuits, would surely open the 
floodgates that the Padilla majority argued were of no concern.97 
The facts of the Eleventh Circuit case are similar to those of Padilla. In 
2002, Gary William Bauder was charged with aggravated stalking of a 
minor in violation of Florida state law.98 He and his lawyer began plea 
negotiations, which ended in an agreement to a no-contest plea, in exchange 
for which Bauder would serve nine months in prison, one year of 
“community control,” and five years of probation.99 In 2006, following his 
release from prison, Bauder admitted to violations of the terms of his 
community control, for which he was placed back in prison in December of 
that year.100 The day before his scheduled release from prison, the state of 
Florida successfully petitioned to have Bauder declared a “sexually violent 
predator.”101 As a result of that petition, Bauder was involuntarily civilly 
committed beginning at the conclusion of his prison term; Bauder was still 
committed as of the writing of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in September 
2010.102 
Bauder filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district 
court in Florida, challenging his civil confinement. In his petition, he 
alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney had affirmatively misadvised him with regard to the possibility of 
 
95
  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96
  See Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has noted that when the law is unclear a criminal defense attorney must advise his client 
that the ‘pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse [collateral] consequences.’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483)). 
97
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484–85. 
98
  Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1273. 
99
  Id. 
100
  Id. at 1273 n.2. 
101
  Id. 
102
  Id. 
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civil commitment.103 The district court granted the petition, finding that 
Bauder’s attorney misadvised him and holding that the misadvice 
constituted deficient performance and prejudiced him, thus satisfying both 
parts of the Strickland test.104 On appeal, the state of Florida argued that 
Bauder’s attorney had not rendered ineffective assistance because it was not 
clear whether the collateral consequence of civil commitment would be 
imposed on Bauder.105 The court rejected this argument and cited Padilla 
for the proposition that where it is unclear whether a consequence will be 
imposed on a criminal defendant, the attorney must warn his client of the 
possible imposition of collateral consequences.106 As a result, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. 
The facts of Bauder were fairly similar to those of Padilla (both 
defendants were subjected to a collateral consequence due to a guilty plea 
and both received affirmative misadvice from counsel about the possible 
imposition of the consequence), but Bauder suffered a different collateral 
consequence. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Bauder differed from 
Padilla in that the court seemed to rely upon counsel’s misadvice, rather 
than counsel’s failure to warn.107 However, the Eleventh Circuit 
nevertheless cited Padilla as broadly requiring that “a criminal defense 
attorney must advise his client” that the plea may carry a risk of collateral 
consequences.108 The Bauder court’s restatement of Padilla, replacing 
“deportation consequences” with the much broader “collateral 
consequences,” extends Padilla to its outer limit—a requirement of Padilla 
warnings for all criminal defendants about all collateral consequences. 
It remains to be seen whether other circuits will apply the Bauder 
court’s reading of Padilla. However, Bauder makes clear that an extension, 




  Id. at 1274. The attorney apparently said to Bauder, both before and after the plea bargain was 
reached, that he “never believed that the facts [of Bauder’s case] would be sufficient to trigger a [civil 
commitment] proceeding.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Court 
repeatedly referred to these statements as “misadvice,” but it is not clear that statements to this effect are 
necessarily misadvice; in fact, that statement could arguably have provided notice to Bauder that such a 
proceeding was a possibility. See id. 
104
  Id. 
105
  Id. at 1274–75. 
106
  Id. at 1275. 
107
  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. 
108
  Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275 (emphasis added). 
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IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH PADILLA WARNINGS 
A. Floodgates 
The opinion for the Court in Padilla attempted to address the 
“floodgates concerns”—voiced by the respondent and by amici including 
the United States Government—that the Court’s holding would create a 
flood of new ineffective assistance claims.109 The majority wrote: 
  We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor 
General, respondent, and amici have stressed regarding the importance of 
protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We 
confronted a similar “floodgates” concern in Hill but nevertheless applied 
Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his 
parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty. 
  A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake.110 
The majority argued that even insofar as its holding increases the ease 
with which criminal defendants who pleaded guilty can show deficient 
performance of counsel, the prejudice prong of Strickland presents a “high 
bar” to prospective claimants.111 Furthermore, the Court continued, for at 
least the preceding fifteen years, “professional norms have generally 
imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation 
consequences of a client’s plea.”112 Thus, the Court predicted that lower 
courts would be able to “effectively and efficiently use [Strickland’s] 
framework to separate specious claims from those with substantial merit.”113 
Even if this argument validly dispatches with the floodgates concerns it 
purports to answer,114 the Court is addressing the wrong flood. 
The Court’s answer to the floodgates concerns of the respondent 
presumes that the flood of ineffective assistance claims would come only 
from those defendants who were subject to deportation, and the Court 
dismisses that category as being made up of defendants who (1) will 
already have received notification and (2) will have difficulty overcoming 
Strickland’s requirement of prejudice. However, the respondent’s brief 
expresses a different and broader concern. The office of the Kentucky 
Attorney General, in its brief to the Court, argued that finding Padilla’s 
counsel ineffective would create a flood of ineffective assistance claims 
from persons who suffered from any collateral consequence as a result of 
 
109
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484–85. 
110
  Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
111
  Id. at 1485. 
112
  Id. 
113
  Id. 
114
  It is not actually clear that the ability of lower courts to distinguish among specious and 
meritorious claims will prevent a flood. The concern is not, or ought not be, the possibility of a flood of 
meritorious ineffective assistance claims, but rather the possibility of a flood of claims the merits of 
which lower courts will be forced to devote time to deciding. 
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pleading guilty.115 The argument that defendants will, by and large, already 
have been apprised of the possibility of deportation is not responsive to the 
broader concerns that the respondent and amici voiced.116 In all likelihood, 
courts can expect a flood of litigation from criminal defendants who 
suffered a variety of collateral consequences as a result of a guilty plea. 
This flood will impose a significant burden on lower federal courts. 
That burden may be further exacerbated by the possibility that Padilla 
will be applied retroactively.117 The retroactivity of Padilla is limited, as a 
practical matter, because of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA),118 which imposes a one-year statute of limitations on 
habeas petitions.119 However, that statute of limitations, which typically 
begins to run upon entry of a final judgment, can be extended by Supreme 
Court recognition of a new right that is applied retroactively.120 
Even though it is limited by the short statutory period in AEDPA, the 
retroactive application of Padilla could increase the number of criminal 
defendants with colorable habeas claims. Any defendant entitled to such a 
claim who was convicted at any point would have one year to file a 
petition. And, regardless of AEDPA, any defendant whose direct appeal has 
not been completed would be entitled to assert a newly discovered 
ineffective assistance claim in a direct appeal or as a collateral challenge. 
Thus, the statute of limitations imposed by AEDPA will not prevent a flood 
of new ineffective assistance claims. 
B. Expertise Requirement 
Criminal defense attorneys will pay a price as well if Padilla warnings 
for all collateral consequences become constitutionally required.121 Criminal 
 
115
  Brief of Respondent at 35–36, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2473880, at 
*35–36 (“The relative importance of a collateral consequence to a particular defendant does not create a 
constitutional right. To do so would open the floodgates wherein pleas are challenged based on incorrect 
advice regarding any and all types of consequences collateral to a valid plea.”). 
116
  Note that Solicitor General (now Justice) Kagan’s amicus brief expressed a concern of similar 
breadth (not limited to the single collateral consequence of deportation) to that expressed by the 
commonwealth of Kentucky. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 
17–18, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223, at *17–18. 
117
  See supra Part II.C. 
118
  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
119
  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006) (statute of limitations for habeas petitions by persons in 
custody pursuant to a judgment of state court); § 2255(f) (statute of limitations for habeas petitions by 
persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of federal court). 
120
  See § 2255(f)(1), (3). 
121
  Even if Padilla is not extended to reach other collateral consequences, criminal attorneys will 
face new and probably onerous expertise requirements, a concern that Justice Alito expressed in his 
concurrence: 
[T]he collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have 
expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess—and 
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defense attorneys are expected to have expertise in their field—criminal law 
and trial practice. Defense attorneys may not, however, be experts in all of 
the other areas of law that can be implicated when a client pleads guilty. 
Defense attorneys are not necessarily experts in immigration law (though 
their clients may be subject to removal); civil procedure and trial practice 
(though their clients may be subject to forfeiture of assets or other forms of 
civil liability after a plea); civil rights law (though their clients may 
collaterally be deprived of constitutional rights, such as voting rights and 
Second Amendment rights); family law (though criminal convictions may 
beget collateral issues relating to adoption and parental rights); and so on.122 
However, if courts begin to require defense attorneys to provide Padilla 
warnings about any collateral consequence of pleading guilty, expertise in 
all of these areas and many more will become obligatory. Defense attorneys 
will risk findings by courts that they provided ineffective assistance if they 
do not adequately apprise their clients of the entire constellation of 
collateral consequences that may result from a guilty plea. 
Imposing such a broad requirement of expertise—in areas in which 
criminal defense attorneys have no preexisting reason to be expert—is not 
in keeping with the first part of the Strickland test. In order to prevail in the 
first part of the Strickland test, a convicted defendant must demonstrate that 
his attorney was deficient—that the attorney’s advice was not “within the 
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”123 This 
range of competence presumably does not include the ability to offer 
competent and knowledgeable legal advice in every area of law in which 
collateral consequences exist. The very reason there are tax lawyers, 
immigration lawyers, and criminal lawyers is that these areas of the law all 
require career-long specialization in order to amass expertise. By imposing 
an expertise requirement in an area of legal specialization outside the 
criminal defense attorney’s own, the Padilla Court was either disregarding 
the “range of competence” language from multiple effective assistance 
cases,124 or was drastically expanding the range in which attorneys are 
expected to be competent. Neither of these possibilities bodes well for 
defense attorneys in the future. 
Furthermore, this is not a burden defense attorneys are necessarily best 
situated to bear. By deciding Padilla under the rubric of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Court placed the onus on defense lawyers, putting them in 
 
very often do not possess—expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them 
to provide expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of training and experience. 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring). 
122
  See supra Part III.A. 
123
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
124
  In a literal sense the Court was disregarding this language—the Court never mentioned 
“competence,” even though both the concurrence and the dissent did. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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jeopardy of being found ineffective if they fail to provide adequate Padilla 
warnings. However, even if criminal defendants must be informed of the 
collateral consequences of a plea, defense attorneys may not be ideally 
positioned to provide that information. 
Criminal defense attorneys are specialists, and as such they would have 
to acquire new, additional expertise in order to dispense adequate Padilla 
warnings.125 Other actors involved in the guilty plea process are potentially 
better suited to inform criminal defendants of the collateral consequences of 
a plea. Prosecutors, for instance, might have expertise in a wider variety of 
areas of law that collateral consequences implicate.126 Moreover, in plea-
bargaining situations, which is to say the vast majority of criminal cases, 
the prosecutor plays an administrative, perhaps quasi-judicial role.127 As 
now-Circuit Judge Gerard Lynch notes, in this role, the prosecutor often 
makes nonnegotiable plea offers based on his own perceptions of the case 
and his desired policy goals.128 Thus, even if Padilla warnings serve a 
desirable function, they might be better coming from prosecutors (who by 
virtue of fully looking into the collateral consequences of a plea deal might 
alter the calculus before making a nonnegotiable offer) than from defense 
attorneys. 
Judges might also be in a better position than criminal defense 
attorneys to inform criminal defendants of the collateral consequences of a 
plea. Judges are likely to be more knowledgeable about a broader cross-
section of the law than defense attorneys. Thus, judges would experience 
lower costs than defense attorneys in gathering the information necessary to 
provide Padilla warnings. Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure already provide a process in which judges advise and question 
defendants who choose to plead guilty.129 These Rule 11 colloquies are 
already obligatory—the Supreme Court has held that defendants are entitled 
to withdraw their plea if the sentencing federal district judge fails to fully 
 
125
  But see Chin & Holmes, supra note 21, at 738 (arguing that with just three questions a defense 
attorney could accurately dispense advice about collateral consequences). The Chin and Holmes 
argument does not rebut the claim that Padilla warnings would require additional expertise. The 
questions they recommend would expose whether the client would be of the class of defendants subject 
to collateral consequences but would not actually provide the attorney with sufficient information to 
provide nuanced and expert legal advice. 
126
  As one example of this expanded expertise, the United States Attorney’s office in a given federal 
district will, in addition to trying the federal criminal cases in that district, try immigration cases, civil 
forfeiture cases, etc. For a list of the entire constellation of federal statutes to which the Criminal 
Division of the United States Attorney’s office is assigned, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-4.000 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_
room/usam/title9/4mcrm.htm. 
127
  See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2129 (1988) (“The prosecutor, then, is making a determination of guilt or innocence (and . . . often 
also one of the appropriate punishment).”). 
128
  Id. at 2130 & n.10. 
129
  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). 
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adhere to the Rule 11 procedure.130 Simply adding a discussion of collateral 
consequences into the Rule 11 colloquy that is already required of judges 
would provide the same benefits as Padilla warnings, but at a lower cost.131 
C. Disclaimer Issues 
Even if Padilla warnings could theoretically be beneficial, they may 
not in practice effectively notify defendants of the collateral consequences 
of guilty pleas. While the court system and criminal defense attorneys will 
face some burden even if Padilla is not extended, a requirement of Padilla 
warnings may, on balance, be a good thing for criminal defendants 
themselves. Indeed, providing more information about the consequences of 
pleading guilty is an admirable goal.132 Criminal defendants as a group are 
presumably less knowledgeable and sophisticated than the state and federal 
prosecutors on the other side of the table during plea negotiations, and 
providing defendants with a full accounting of the ramifications of their 
guilty pleas might lead to increased bargaining power and an increased 
likelihood of actual voluntariness and informed consent. Warnings about 
the possibility of collateral consequences would, at the very least, create 
greater consistency across plea negotiations, since all defendants, and not 
just some, would know about which collateral consequences they faced.133 
But while Padilla creates some advantages for criminal defendants, those 
advantages come with corresponding costs. 
It is not yet clear how much Padilla will be extended, or how Padilla 
and its extensions will be implemented. As of now, attorneys must 
somehow notify their clients of the possible deportation consequences of a 
plea. Future case law will undoubtedly provide further guidance as to the 
extent of the warnings (i.e., whether Padilla warnings will have to be 
tailored to a specific client or whether attorneys can simply say “just so you 
know, all guilty pleas carry the risk of collateral consequences, deportation, 
etc.”).134 Attorneys may begin to offer boilerplate Padilla warnings to their 
clients so as to provide notice, at least constructively, and avoid claims of 
ineffective assistance. The more general Padilla warnings get, and the more 
 
130
  McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1969). 
131
  This option was available to the Court in Padilla, which could have decided the case under the 
rubric of due process instead of assistance of counsel. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 & 
n.1 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132
  See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 21, at 703 (arguing that as a result of failure to apprise 
defendants of collateral consequences, “defendants may be misled into pleading g[u]ilty, which is 
unjust”). 
133
  See id. (arguing that notifying criminal defendants of the collateral consequences of a plea 
“would help achieve more consistent and fair results, in which the plea and sentence would be based 
more on the facts and circumstances”). 
134
  Presumably future case law will also instruct attorneys as to how they have to give warnings, 
whether written Padilla warnings are acceptable, and so on. 
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extensive the list of collateral consequences requiring warnings becomes, 
the less effective these warnings will be. 
Padilla warnings that are ineffective will provide few or no benefits to 
criminal defendants.135 The difficulties associated with fine print, form 
contracts, and other documents containing warnings or agreements in legal 
language are well documented.136 As Padilla warnings become more 
widespread, they may be increasingly ignored or misunderstood. If this 
occurs, and if warnings become incomprehensible form documents or long 
disclaimers, Padilla will have been for naught, as the decision will have 
imposed a burden on attorneys and courts without producing the benefit of 
actual (as opposed to merely constructive) notice of collateral consequences 
for defendants.137 
V. LIMITING PADILLA 
The difficulty that courts will face is neither the sheer number of 
collateral consequences of guilty pleas nor the likely difficulty courts will 
have in line drawing. Rather, the real concern is the existence of a select 
few collateral consequences that are difficult to logically distinguish from 
deportation—consequences like civil commitment, civil forfeiture, 
disenfranchisement, and the loss of public benefits. These consequences—
and perhaps others—present unique problems in the context of Padilla. Just 
as removal is often “automatic”138 and especially severe,139 so too are these 
particular collateral consequences. The extension of Padilla to cover this 
relatively small number of consequences is plausible, and perhaps even 
likely.140 And as discussed above, these few consequences can apply to a 
 
135
  Concededly, this is only an issue if attorneys begin to provide general, disclaimer-like Padilla 
warnings as a matter of course. If courts require attorneys to warn individual clients about whatever 
collateral consequences may affect them personally, without including extraneous information, there 
may not be any problem. 
136
  For example, Professor Todd Rakoff, in an article about contracts of adhesion, noted that a 
variety of forms go unread even by very sophisticated individuals. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983). He wrote: “I have asked 
many lawyers and law professors over the past few years whether they ever read various form 
documents, such as their bank-card agreements; the great majority of even this highly sophisticated 
sample do not.” Id. at 1179 n.22. 
137
  Of course, this result—procedural criminal protections becoming ineffective for some criminal 
defendants—is one that the legal system has turned a blind eye to in other contexts. See, e.g., Morgan 
Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 572 (2002) (noting that Miranda warnings are ineffective—that is, they provide 
constructive but not actual notice—for the mentally retarded and others of below-average intelligence). 
138
  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). 
139
  Id. at 1486. 
140
  If the only concerns courts had were logic and fairness, extension would be practically 
obligatory. To create in noncitizen criminal defendants a right to know about the likelihood of 
deportation (enforced by creating an obligation on defense counsel to inform), but to fail to do so with, 
say, sexually predatory criminal defendants with regard to the likelihood of civil commitment, would be 
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wide swath of the population of criminal defendants pleading guilty. Thus, 
even with a “limited” extension of Padilla to the most severe or automatic 
consequences, a large proportion of the 95% of criminal defendants whose 
convictions result from guilty pleas would either have a new ground for a 
habeas petition or direct appeal (if they were already convicted and Padilla 
is found to be retroactive) or would become entitled to a Padilla warning 
from their defense attorneys if negotiations are ongoing. Insofar as such an 
extension is worth avoiding, there are a few different approaches by which 
lower courts could effectively cabin Padilla. 
A. Limit Padilla to Affirmative Misadvice 
One way that courts interpreting Padilla could reduce its scope is by 
limiting it to its specific facts.141 The facts in Padilla did not present the 
Court with a defendant whose attorney had been silent on the issue of 
deportation, so the majority opinion did not have to decide that attorneys 
rendered constitutionally deficient performance if they remained silent on 
that issue.142 Accordingly, courts could decline to extend Padilla to other 
collateral consequences except where attorneys affirmatively misadvised 
their clients.143 This strategy has the unique advantage of cabining Padilla to 
avoid imposing the steep costs of an affirmative duty on defense counsel 
while also holding defense attorneys to a higher standard than the one to 
which they had previously been held. 
This is arguably what the Eleventh Circuit did in Bauder.144 There, the 
petitioner had been affirmatively misadvised about the possibility of civil 
commitment, and the court used that affirmative misadvice as its 
justification for affirming the lower court’s grant of habeas corpus.145 If 
courts choose (or feel logically compelled) to extend Padilla to other 
collateral consequences, they can do so in contexts similar to the one 
 
unfair. Deportation may be “banishment or exile,” id. (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 
391 (1947)), but deported individuals return to countries of which they are citizens and where they are at 
liberty upon arrival. That fate is inarguably less severe than indefinite civil commitment, which for some 
sex offenders turns any sentence into a lifetime of incarceration. 
141
  See supra Part II.A. 
142
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 (“Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds 
with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of ‘the advantages and disadvantages of a plea 
agreement.’” (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995))). 
143
  This is the result Justice Alito’s concurrence advocated. Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring). 
144
  I say “arguably” because of the ambiguity of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Bauder. On one 
hand, the Bauder court used language to the effect that attorneys “must advise.” Bauder v. Dep’t of 
Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). On the other hand, the court indicated that it was affirming 
the lower court’s grant of habeas corpus specifically because Bauder’s attorney affirmatively misadvised 
him. Id. It is highly likely that the Eleventh Circuit valued the distinction between affirmative misadvice 
and silence, since a year before its decision was handed down it had heard Bauder’s case and remanded 
because the court below had failed to distinguish between affirmative misadvice and silence. See Bauder 
v. Dep’t of Corr., 333 F. App’x 422, 424 (11th Cir. 2009). 
145
  Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275. 
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presented in Bauder, in which the defendant received incorrect advice 
rather than none at all.146 
The Padilla majority argued that differentiating between silence and 
misadvice would have the “absurd result[]” of incentivizing silence about 
important matters by defense counsel.147 This result, however, is not so 
absurd. In fact, most jurisdictions do distinguish between silence and 
misadvice by considering only the latter to be ineffective assistance.148 
Moreover, the Court sold attorneys short when it said that a holding limited 
to misadvice would incentivize silence. On the contrary, such a holding 
would have disincentivized giving incorrect advice. It is disappointing that 
the Court seems to have based its holding on a fear that defense attorneys 
would do only what was constitutionally required of them to avoid 
ineffective assistance. 
B. Limit Padilla to Deportation 
A second way of reducing the reach of Padilla by declining to extend it 
would be to simply subscribe to the Court’s argument that deportation is 
“unique.”149 Lower federal courts could apply Padilla as written to require 
criminal defense lawyers to warn their clients if they face deportation as a 
result of a plea, but refuse to extend it to other collateral consequences. 
Lower courts could rationalize this approach two different ways.150 
First, the Padilla Court explained that professional norms already 
suggested that attorneys should warn their clients that they may be 
deported.151 Since Strickland requires objectively reasonable performance 
that comports with professional norms,152 and since there is a professional 
norm that dictates attorneys should warn their clients about immigration 
consequences of plea agreements, failure to warn could be considered 
 
146
  Circuit courts, of course, do not select their cases like the Supreme Court does, but they could 
distinguish nonaffirmative-misadvice situations from Padilla, or they could rule that affirmative 
misadvice constitutes deficient performance under Strickland but silence does not. 
147
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. 
148
  See Roberts, supra note 21, at 125–26 (noting that most jurisdictions that have examined the 
issue have concluded that affirmative misadvice about collateral consequences, but not silence, can force 
courts to permit defendants to withdraw a guilty plea). Similarly, at least three circuit courts already had 
a policy of finding ineffective assistance where defense counsel affirmatively misrepresented the 
possibility of deportation. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1493 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing United States 
v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 
2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1985)). Padilla abrogated 
all three circuit decisions. 
149
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. 
150
  These justifications gloss over the fact that Padilla cannot logically be confined to immigration 
on the stated bases of the Supreme Court’s holding. They could nevertheless be employed by courts to 
prevent extension. 
151
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
152
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of practice . . . are 
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.”). 
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deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test.153 As long as lower 
courts do not find that professional norms similarly require warnings about 
other collateral consequences, Padilla can be limited to deportation simply 
by application of Strickland.154 
Second, courts could simply decline to treat deportation as a collateral 
consequence altogether. The Padilla Court noted the difficulty in 
categorizing deportation as either direct or collateral to a plea.155 Indeed, 
deportation could be framed as a direct consequence of a guilty plea, since 
it is “definite, immediate, and largely automatic.”156 Deportation may be 
imposed, as a technical matter, in a separate civil proceeding. However, it 
is, as a factual matter, a direct consequence of pleading guilty.157 By treating 
immigration consequences as noncollateral, courts could limit Padilla to 
deportation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court majority that decided Padilla did so with the 
difficulties that criminal defendants face in mind. In a world in which 
prosecutors wield an enormous bargaining advantage during the plea 
process, providing additional information to criminal defendants is an 
admirable aim. 
Unfortunately, this additional information comes at too high a cost and 
with too much risk of extension to other collateral consequences. Even if 
Padilla has an eventual logical stopping-point, that point comes after 
extension to many other collateral consequences that are as serious as 
deportation. Because of Padilla, we may soon live in a legal system in 
which criminal defendants are not “effectively” assisted by counsel until 
they are warned of the many collateral consequences that may be imposed 
on them due to a guilty plea. 
 
153
  More accurately, failure to warn about immigration consequences was arguably deficient before 
Padilla and is now per se deficient. 
154
  This approach is undermined by the fact that the ABA Standards that the Strickland Court 
identified as a possible guide to professional norms “require defense lawyers to consider collateral 
consequences of conviction” in counseling their clients about guilty pleas. Chin & Holmes, supra note 
21, at 701; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999) (“[D]efense counsel should 
determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible 
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”). 
155
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (“Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because 
of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a 
collateral consequence.”). 
156
  21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 620 (2008). The Court noted that deportation was “virtually 
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
157
  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a 
removable offense . . . his removal is practically inevitable . . . .”). 
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These Padilla warnings will ask a great deal of defense attorneys by 
imposing significant expertise requirements on them. These warnings will 
require a great deal of courts, particularly in the near term, in the form of 
larger dockets. Padilla warnings could make defendants reluctant to plead 
guilty to crimes, which has for many years been the mode of disposition for 
almost all criminal cases.158 
Even with all of these costs, it is not clear that Padilla will actually 
benefit criminal defendants at all. Will criminal defendants decide to take 
the risk of going to trial at a greater clip? The evidence against them is often 
overwhelming, and going to trial to avoid now-warned-about collateral 
consequences may cost them in the form of increased direct consequences 
such as longer prison sentences. For that matter, Padilla could have no 
effect at all. Jose Padilla himself was getting deported, plea agreement or 
not. He was arrested with a significant amount of marijuana in his 
possession, and he was going to be subject to essentially mandatory 
removal whether he lost at trial or pleaded guilty.159 The Court’s new rule, 
mandating warnings about deportation and providing ineffective assistance 
claims for those who are not warned, allows Padilla to stay in the country 
for a little longer as he continues to try his case, but that is all it does. For 
countless defendants in similar situations, the Padilla decision and the 
practically inevitable lower court decisions extending it will provide a new 
cause of action, but not actual relief. 
That said, Padilla need not be overturned. Courts should simply refrain 
from extending it, and should opt instead to limit it to its specific facts. In 
doing so, lower courts will avoid imposing significant costs on our legal 
system for a questionable benefit. 
 
158
  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
159
  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477–78. 
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